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1962/10/25

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE (A/CDC/ADR)

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Prepared by
ARA

10/25/62

CADR

1. The best channel for approaching Castro would be through the Brazilian Ambassador to Cuba, Luis Bastien Pinto. The Brazilian Government has shown some interest in this line of action in the past. The Ambassador has recently been in Washington and we feel he would be effective. He is one of the few people who could have quick access to Castro. Contact with outsiders like the Ambassador to the UN raises problem of secret communications to Castro. It is essential that any approach reach Castro's ears only.

2. The timing of any such approach should be related to a growing awareness by Castro that the Latin American countries are against him and that the Soviet Union is not willing to risk conflict with the US to support him. It should also coincide with growing awareness of the Cuban people of these views and a growing concern about their future. This could be facilitated if there were active speculation of a possibility of a total blockade and, if our decision making processes had proceeded to the point that we could include in the message to Castro a deadline for extension of the blockade if he doesn't respond.

3. The appeal to Castro should emphasize the degree to which he is a puppet of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union desertion of him and discussion of use of his position in Cuba as a bargaining point for concessions elsewhere. The President's

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statement that the only nonnegotiable items between the US and Castro are the military tie to the Soviet Union and aggression in Latin American should also be conveyed. There should be a graphic description of the increasing economic difficulties ; if blockade is tightened, with definite assurances that it will be unless the missile bases are removed. Preferably a deadline of something like 48 hours might be given before escalation of the blockade is to begin. We should also offer assistance if requested in removal of the Soviet military personnel. In the statement to him it should be made absolutely clear that the nuclear missiles must be removed and that UN or other impartial personnel must have an opportunity to determine that it had been done. Cutting the tie with Moscow would also involve other actions related to Soviet Union military technicians and almost inevitably the position of the old line Communists in the Government, though this latter point is something that will follow rather normally rather than having to be made a condition precedent.

4. While the prospects of Castro ~~xxxx~~ accepting such an offer may not be great we might wish after making it to consider letting it be known ^{after} that we got his answer as this could easily create splits in the regime.


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p. It would probably take 24-48 hours to secure Brazilian agreement to instruct their Ambassador in this sense and communicate those instructions to him. How long it would take him to reach Castroz cannot be predicted. But he ought to be able to do so fairly promptly


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